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ABSTRACT 
 
Total debt in the People’s Republic of China has increased significantly in recent years, mostly on 
account of nonfinancial corporate debt. Earning and the financial performance of corporate firms have 
weakened, and so has the asset quality of the financial sector. This paper assesses the financial fragility 
of the Chinese economy by looking at risk factors in the nonfinancial sector. We apply quantile 
regressions to a rich dataset of Chinese listed companies contained in Standard & Poor’s IQ Capital 
database. We find higher sensitivity over time of corporate leverage to some of its key determinants, 
particularly for firms at the upper margin of the distribution. In particular, profitability increasingly acts 
as a curb on corporate leverage. At a time of falling profitability across the Chinese nonfinancial 
corporate sector, this eases the brake on leverage and may contribute to its continuing increase. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: corporate debt, debt sustainability, panel quantile regression, People’s Republic of China 
 
JEL codes: G01, G21, H30, H60 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate leverage in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) accelerated in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis, accentuating industrial overcapacity in traditional sectors and fueling asset bubbles in 
the property, stock, and bond markets. Earnings and financial performance of companies have 
deteriorated, and with them the asset quality of the Chinese financial sector holding the bulk of the 
corporate debt. Warnings about the dangers of excessive corporate leverage and financial sector 
vulnerability have been a staple of the international press since at least 2015, and also the Chinese 
authorities have recognized the problem. 
 
Much of the debate on debt and financial sustainability in the PRC has centered on aggregate 
data and indicators, which suggest a marked rise in corporate debt and nonperforming loans held by 
the domestic banking system. However, a macro focus tends to overlook heterogeneity and 
vulnerabilities at the micro level, which are relevant to policy formulation (Bernanke and Campbell 
1988). For example, recent market analysis associates the energy sector with the lowest return on 
capital and the largest increase in nonperforming loan ratios among Chinese industries, suggesting that 
it should be a prime focus of authorities’ monitoring efforts (S&P Global Market Intelligence 2016).  
 
Additional and more systematic insights can be gained from regression analysis of corporate 
balance sheet data. Early attempts, predating the recent credit surge, can be found in the literature 
assessing the determinants of capital structure in the PRC (e.g. Chen 2004, Huang and Song 2006). It 
shows that the insights from modern finance theory of capital structure are borne out in the Chinese 
corporate data, notwithstanding institutional differences compared to the United States (US) and 
European markets and the presence of financial constraints in the Chinese banking sector.1  
 
This paper builds on this strain of literature to determine the drivers of nonfinancial corporate 
debt in the PRC during the credit surge since 2009. Focus is on the margins of the corporate 
distribution and on variations in the determinants of corporate leverage that could signal rising risk of 
financial distress particularly in these segments of the Chinese corporate landscape. This is 
accomplished through the use of panel and simultaneous quantile analysis, beyond the mean-based 
ordinary least squares regression analysis of previous approaches. The empirical investigation relies on 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) IQ Capital database, which contains richly detailed historical balance sheet 
data and key financial indicators of Chinese companies up until 2015 at this time of writing. The 
dataset is summarized in Appendix Tables A1, A2.1, and A2.2. 
 
We find that, over time, corporate leverage has become more sensitive to changes in some of 
its key determinants, particularly for firms at the upper margin of the distribution. In particular, 
profitability appears to have increased over time its impact as a curb on corporate leverage. Among the 
underlying reasons is the government-induced massive stimulus to stem the global financial crisis, 
which caused a significant decline in lending rates and incentivizes companies to borrow instead of 
relying on retained earnings as a source of funding.  This eases the brake on leverage at a time when 
corporate profitability is falling, and likely contributes to further rises of corporate debt.   
 
The paper is structured to provide a brief overview of rising leverage and financial risk in the 
PRC’s corporate sector, in section II. This is followed, in section III, by a presentation of the empirical 
                                                            
1  In particular, the state exerts vast control over the state-owned enterprises and the financial system, which reduces the 
likelihood and costs of financial distress compared to those facing the private corporate sector (Chen 2004, Borst and 
Lardy 2015). 
2   |   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 509 
framework and the data used, and a discussion of the results achieved. The paper closes with lessons 
for policy and broader conclusions, in section IV.  
 
 
II. CORPORATE LEVERAGE AND GROWING FINANCIAL RISK 
 
Stable at roughly 40% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2015, general government debt in the PRC 
is not particularly large compared to other emerging economies.2 However, total debt across all sectors 
ballooned to nearly 290% by the second quarter of 2016 (Figure 1). The massive buildup of debt—
mostly domestic—accelerated from the end of 2008 onward, when the government enacted 
unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus to stem the impact of the global financial crisis.3 Fiscal 
stimulus alone amounted to nearly CNY6 trillion—or 18.5% of GDP—between 2008 and 2010 
(Ferrarini, Jha, and Ramayandi 2012).  
 
Stimulus often was directed to the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) whose liabilities grew to 
115% of GDP in 2015, or funneled through the policy and state-controlled commercial banks. The net 
effect of intervention was a significant though discontinuous fall in the benchmark lending rate, from 
nearly 7.5% in January 2008 to 5.3% by 2010, and 4.3% by the end of 2015 (Figure 2). The decline in 
the lending rate is likely to have altered the relative opportunity cost of the alternative funding sources 
for firms, and in particular between retained earnings and external debt.  
 
Figure 1: People’s Republic of China—Total Debt 
(% of GDP) 
 
 
GDP = gross domestic product. 
Note: Q2 2016 is an estimate. 
Source:  International Institute of Finance. 2016.  Emerging Market Debt 
Monitor, June 2016. Washington, DC. 
                                                            
2  Accounting for both explicit and contingent off-budget liabilities incurred by local governments through their financing 
platforms, the International Monetary Fund estimates that the PRC’s public debt ratio is substantially higher, at 56% in 
2015, and will rise to nearly 74% of GDP by 2021 (IMF 2016b). 
3  And grow it did: the PRC’s real GDP expanded on average by nearly 9.2% each year between 2009 and 2013, while the US, 
Japan, and the euro area were struggling with 0.3% growth on average (ADB 2011, 2013). 
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Figure 2: People’s Republic of China—Benchmark 
Lending Rate (%) 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg (accessed 21 November 2016). 
 
The PRC’s credit to GDP gap—measuring banking risk and defined as the difference between 
the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend—reached 30.1 in the first quarter of 2016 (BIS 2016). 
The Bank for International Settlements warns that this exceeds the gap of any other country it has 
been tracking, as well as that of the East Asian economies involved in the 1998 crisis and the US’ prior 
to the Lehman crisis. Moreover, the PRC’s credit has expanded against the backdrop of a sharply 
slower economic growth in recent years, reflecting weaker external demand as well as authorities’ 
steering efforts toward a more balanced, sustainable growth model.  
 
The credit surge since 2009 worsened industrial overcapacity—hence profitability—in 
traditional sectors, such as steel, cement, and energy, while feeding asset bubbles in the property, 
equity, and bond markets.  At the Chinese corporate level, this has translated into weakened 
fundamentals and a sharp fall in industrial profits, particularly of SOEs. As debtors struggle to service 
interest payments, nonperforming loans (NPLs) have been on the rise. Chinese official figures show 
NPLs continuously rising during the past 4 years, to 1.8% of total loans in the first quarter of 2016. 
However, the PRC does not follow standard international practice in recording NPLs, which tend to be 
understated as a result. Most analysts estimate that the NPL ratio exceeds 15% of total loans 
outstanding (CLSA 2016; Fitch Ratings 2016). This ratio does not include bad debt in the country’s 
shadow banking system, which itself is estimated to have grown more than threefold between the end 
of 2012 and the first quarter of 2016, to about 10% of bank assets (S&P Global Ratings 2016a). 
 
Data limitations notwithstanding, rising pressure in the Chinese corporate sector is best 
gauged at the firm level, as the share of total debt held by companies whose earnings before interest, 
tax, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) are insufficient to cover interest expenses. This ratio is 
seen spiking from 3.5% or less throughout the period from 1998 to 2011, to nearly 7% in 2012, and to 
more than 14% in 2015 (Figure 3. See Appendix Table A3 for detailed results).4 
                                                            
4  Specifically, we derive this measure from the S&P Capital IQ database, described in Appendix Table A1. The S&P data extract 
accounts for all Chinese listed companies for the years between 1990 and 2015. Isolating nonfinancial companies with 
accounting data available, we are able to identify a sample of expanding size over time, from 52 companies in 1998 to 3,377 in 
2015. Companies’ interest coverage ratio (ICR) is defined as the ratio of EBITDA to interest expense. A company is considered 
to be at risk when EBITDA is insufficient to cover its interest expense in any given year, or ICR<1 (IMF 2016a.) This threshold is 
arbitrary. Less conservative approaches have been to define at risk all debt owed by firms with ICR<2 (such as in IMF 2016a). 
The US dollar amount of debt at risk in the Chinese nonfinancial corporate sector is then computed as the ratio of aggregate 
debt owed by companies with ICR<1 to total debt. 
4
5
6
7
8
1/2008 1/2010 1/2012 1/2014 1/2016
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Figure 3: Nonfinancial Corporate Debt at Risk
 
 
 
ICR = interest coverage ratio. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Breaking down the nonfinancial corporate distribution, the interest coverage ratio (ICR) can be 
seen deteriorating across corporate layers delineated by its 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th quantiles 
(Figure 4). Similarly, profitability declined repeatedly between 2009 and 2015 at all five quantiles 
(Figure 5). However, deterioration of these financial ratios is considerably stronger at the upper 95th 
quantile of Chinese nonfinancial corporate distribution, compared to the mean and lower quantiles, 
which suggests that regression analysis is to allow for heterogeneity in the PRC’s corporate landscape. 
 
As a result of growing financial pressures in vast segments of the nonfinancial corporate 
landscape, the Chinese banking system now holds an unprecedented pile of loans that constitutes a 
large contingent burden and is fueling concerns about the growing risks of a disruptive adjustment to 
the Chinese economy, with international repercussions (ADB 2016, Moody’s 2016). Based on current 
market reports, it is unclear to what extent the nation's banking system will be able to absorb 
weakening borrower credit quality without requiring a larger bailout operation by the state. Some 
evidence on banking sector performance can be evinced from the S&P data. We rank the top 50 banks 
according to their total asset holdings in 2015, and group them into four policy and commercial bank 
categories.5 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
5  Following S&P Global Ratings (2016b), we divide banks into the following categories: (i) Top five commercial banks: the 
top five largest banks by far in terms of asset size and with the broadest branch network across the country; (ii) National 
banks: large joint-stock commercial banks with a nationwide network; (iii) Regional banks: smaller joint-stock commercial 
banks and the leading city or rural commercial banks; and (iv) Policy banks: Agricultural Development Bank of China, 
China Development Bank Corporation, and the Export-Import Bank of China, which are used by the Chinese authorities 
to direct financing to certain economic sectors. 
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Figure 4: Nonfinancial Sector ICR Quantiles
 
EBITDA/Interest expense (ICR) 
 
EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization;  
ICR = interest coverage ratio.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Figure 5: Nonfinancial Sector Profitability
 
EBITDA/Total assets 
 
 
EBITDA = earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Financial indicator charts along this breakdown provide evidence of incipient vulnerability in the 
banking sector. Total assets surged across the sector, although at a progressively slowing rate since about 
2010 (Figure 6). The top five commercial banks hold the bulk of assets, but credit growth involved all 
segments of the banking sector, including the regional banks. However, growth in revenues and net income 
did not keep up with that of assets, causing returns on assets to drop significantly in the 3 years to 2015 
(Figure 7). In the meantime, the banking sector failed to raise capital at the same pace as it was issuing 
credits, causing capital ratios to shrink between 2011 and 2014 (Figure 8). This is true in relation to average 
ratios for the 50 top banks taken together, not for the policy banks, which raised capital and saw their ratios 
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increase over the same period. Lately, since 2015, the top five and other commercial banks have been 
raising capital in response to higher loan impairments. Nevertheless, the banking sector’s efforts have been 
insufficient so far to stem against the continuing fall since 2012 of the ratio of loan losses allowance to 
impaired loans (Figure 9). Averaging 2.4 in 2015 across the top 50 banks, coverage appears to be adequate 
still, although the underestimation of impaired loans may grossly overstate this statistic. 
 
Figure 6: Total Assets 
($ billion) 
 
 
 
Note: Data represent group totals. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Figure 7: Return on Assets 
(%) 
 
 
 
Note: Data represent averages. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
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Figure 8: Total Capital Ratios 
(%) 
 
 
 
Notes: Data represent averages. Total capital as a percentage of total risk−weighted 
assets of the bank. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
Figure 9: Coverage Ratio 
 
Allowances for loan losses/Impaired loans 
 
 
Notes: Data represent group averages. Total capital as a percentage of total 
risk−weighted assets of the bank. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
In sum, S&P company data provides evidence of rising leverage in the Chinese nonfinancial 
corporate sector against the backdrop of falling returns and interest coverage ratios. The impact of 
deteriorating asset quality does not yet seem fully reflected in banks’ balance sheets. However, 
weakening capital ratios since the 2009 credit surge and a sharp drop in returns on assets more 
recently appear to signal financial sector vulnerabilities, which are likely to sharpen against the trend of 
rising financial pressure in large segments of the PRC’s corporate sector.   
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III. DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE DEBT 
 
Focus turns now to the determinants of corporate leverage in the PRC. Heterogeneity across the 
nonfinancial corporate sector implies that an aggregate, mean-based approach would be ill suited to 
identifying vulnerabilities, particularly those affecting firms at the margins of the corporate distribution.  
Our empirical approach thus entails quantile regression analysis, which we apply within the framework 
developed by the theoretical literature on corporate debt. This literature has identified a number of 
possible explanations for the capital structure of firms (Titman and Wessels 1988; Harris and Raviv 
1991). According to models based on agency costs, firms choose their debt–equity ratio with a view to 
mitigate the possible conflicts of interest between equity holders and managers, and between equity 
holders and debt holders. An important implication of these theories is that firms with limited scope 
for asset substitution are likely to have higher debt levels, because they face lower agency costs of 
debt. Corporation tax rules could also act as an incentive to issue debt to reduce tax liabilities. In 
general, firms might trade off the increasing agency and bankruptcy costs associated with high debt 
with the tax benefits of increased leverage. 
 
An alternative explanation of capital structure is based on asymmetric information between 
investors and firm’s insiders. Managers may choose a high debt–equity ratio in order to signal the good 
financial health of the firm. A high leverage would credibly convey the signal that the firm faces a low 
risk of bankruptcy. Finally, the pecking order theory of financing argues that firms will seek to avoid the 
higher cost of external debt and the dilution of equity capital associated with new equity issue. Firms 
will finance new investment internally in the first instance; once internal sources of finance are 
exhausted they will issue low-risk debt, and only as a last resort will they choose to issue new equity. 
 
The empirical literature on corporate finance has identified a number of potential 
determinants of the capital structure choice. These determinants include profitability, size, growth 
opportunities, asset tangibility, nondebt tax shields, and volatility or business risk (see Titman and 
Wessels 1988, Harris and Raviv 1991). Profitability should have a negative effect on leverage according 
to the pecking order theory of capital structure. Bigger firms could face a lower risk of default than 
smaller firms because of the greater diversification of their investment. Furthermore, larger firms could 
have easier access to capital markets, and could borrow under better conditions than small firms. We 
would therefore expect a positive effect of firm size on debt. Growth opportunities can be seen as 
noncollateralizable assets: firms with sizable growth opportunities may find it more difficult to borrow 
externally because of the asset substitution effect (Titman and Wessels 1988). By contrast, a greater 
share of tangible assets should have an unambiguously positive effect on leverage because the assets 
can be used as a collateral for loans. Nondebt tax shields, such as depreciation allowances, should have 
a negative influence on leverage because they reduce the incentive to issue external debt (DeAngelo 
and Masulis 1980). Finally, volatility or business risk could be associated with the potential cost of 
financial distress, and should have a negative effect on leverage. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we examine the determinants of the debt–equity ratio of firms, the 
ICR defined as the ratio between EBITDA and interest expense, the debt–earnings ratio (DTE), and 
Altman’s Z-score (ZALT). The regression variables are computed from the S&P Capital IQ database 
and include Chinese company panel data from 2009 to 2015.6 
 
 
 
                                                            
6  The database and variables are described and summarized in Appendix Tables A1 , A2.1 and A2.2. 
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A. Panel Fixed Effects 
 
Table 1 presents the results of estimating the model by panel fixed effects.7 The first three columns 
report estimates for total leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, and for both long-
term leverage and short-term leverage where we consider long-term debt and short-term debt only 
respectively. Profitability has a negative and significant coefficient, which is consistent with the pecking 
order theory of capital structure. Size has a positive and significant coefficient for total leverage LEV 
and for long-term leverage only. Neither asset growth nor earnings volatility is significant for any of the 
measures of leverage. Asset tangibility is positive and significant for all definitions of leverage, 
consistent with both the agency theory and the pecking order theory. Finally, nondebt tax shields—
calculated as the ratio of total depreciation to total assets—are statistically significant but are only 
negative for long-term leverage. That is, nondebt tax shields seem to shorten debt maturity. 
 
Table 1: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Firms, Panel Fixed Effects 
 
 Total Leverage 
Long-term 
Leverage 
Short-term 
Leverage 
1/ Interest 
Coverage 
Ratio 
Debt/Earnings 
Ratio 
1/ Altman 
Z-score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable LEV LLEV SLEV (ICR)-1 DTE (ZALT)-1
PROF –0.208*** –0.092* –0.094*   
(lagged) PROF   –1.548*** –30.720*** 0.010
 
SIZE 0.023*** 0.016*** –0.004 0.060** 1.558***   
(lagged) SIZE     0.104**
 
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001   
(lagged) GROWTA     –0.001
 
TANG 0.210*** 0.083*** 0.096*** –0.130 4.222   
(lagged) TANG     0.212
 
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000       
(lagged) EVOL   0.003 0.071 0.001*
 
NDTS 0.545* –0.365* 0.686** 2.374* –42.104   
(lagged) NDTS     –4.042
 
Constant 0.011 –0.041 0.116*** –0.009 –3.173 –0.199 
Number of 
observations 6,881 6,881 6,881 6,751 6,751 6,747 
Number of groups 983 983 983 983 983 983
R-squared 0.186 0.21 0.029 0.053 0.085 0.007
F-statistic 29.652 14.219 9.694 17.105 14.534 8.083
Hausman  36.37***  43.94*** 52.38*** 64.41***  57.83*** 14.48*
DTE = debt-to-earnings, EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, ICR = interest coverage ratio, LEV = total leverage, 
LLEV = long-term leverage, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, SLEV = short-term leverage,  
TANG = tangibility, ZALT =Altman Z-score. 
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Standard errors are robust and allow for intergroup correlation. Regression variables are computed 
from S&P Capital IQ data, described in Appendix A1, and include Chinese company data from 2009 to 2015, summarized in Appendixes 
A2.1 and A2.2. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
                                                            
7  Hausman tests reject the random effects specification for all the estimated equations. 
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Our findings so far are broadly supportive of the agency and the pecking order theory of capital 
structure, and weakly also of the signaling theory, although they would not be able to discriminate 
conclusively between these alternative theories. 
 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 1 examine potential determinants of key indicators of financial 
fragility of firms. Column (4) reports the results of estimating the equation for the inverse of the ICR 
(ICR)-1. Values of ICR less than one indicate that current earnings fall short of the interest expenses 
which are due, and therefore low values of ICR (or high values of its inverse) are an indicator of 
financial distress. Profitability and earnings volatility have been lagged to avoid potential endogeneity 
with the dependent variable. The fixed-effects estimates show that lagged profitability has a negative 
effect and nondebt tax shield a positive effect as expected. Size has a positive effect, which is 
consistent with its positive influence on leverage. 
 
Column (5) of Table 1 looks at the DTE as the dependent variable. This ratio too is used as an 
indicator of the potential financial distress of companies. Profitability and earning volatility have again 
been lagged to avoid endogeneity. The only significant variables are profitability and size, with a 
negative and a positive coefficient, respectively, as expected. 
 
Finally, column (6) gives the results of estimating the determinants of the inverse Altman’s Z-
score, (ZALT)-1. The Z-score is a weighted average of five ratios: (i) working capital/total assets; (ii) 
retained earnings/total assets; (iii) earnings before interest and taxes/total assets; (iv) the market value 
of equity/the book value of total liabilities; and (v) sales/total assets (Altman 1968). It is usually 
interpreted as a predictor of the probability that the company will go into bankruptcy within 2 years. 
High values of the inverse Z-score can thus be read as indicating low bankruptcy risk. All the regressors 
are lagged one period in the fixed effect regressions to avoid simultaneity bias. Among the statistically 
significant variables, size has a large and positive coefficient, which indicates that size is associated 
with a lower probability of bankruptcy. Earnings volatility also has a positive and significant coefficient, 
but its effect is relatively modest in absolute value. 
 
B. Quantile Regression Panel Data 
 
The estimates in Table 1 allow for firm-specific, time-invariant fixed effects ߙ௜  to capture the 
unobserved heterogeneity across firms in the response of the dependent variable to the conditioning 
variables. A potential shortcoming of this approach is that it assumes a common response of the 
dependent variable to the explanatory variables for all firms. This can be a strong assumption, since the 
response of the dependent variable could be different across the distribution of firms. For example, 
variables such as the size of the firm or the share of tangible assets could play a different role 
depending on whether the firm is already highly leveraged or not. In this case, a more suitable approach 
to estimating the response of the dependent variables to the conditioning variables across the whole 
distribution of firms is to estimate the model by quantile regression (Koenker and Basset 1978). 
Quantile regression estimation allows for different values of the regression coefficients across the 
different quantiles of the distribution of firms, and is therefore able to capture nonlinearities in the 
response of the dependent variable to its determinants.8 
 
Quantile regressions with fixed effects for panel data presents however the difficulty that 
quantile estimators with additive fixed effects may not have the same interpretation as cross-sectional 
                                                            
8  Fattouh, Harris, and Scaramozzino (2005, 2008) use quantile regression to study capital structure in the Republic of 
Korea and in the United Kingdom, respectively. 
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regressions. The reason for this is that, using conventional notation, the distribution of ሺ ௜ܻ௧ െ ߙ௜ሻ| ௜ܺ௧ is 
not order-isomorphic to the distribution of ௜ܻ௧| ௜ܺ௧: an observation which lies in one of the low quantiles 
of the distribution with respect to ௜ܻ௧  may lie in one of the top quantiles of the distribution with respect 
to ሺ ௜ܻ௧ െ ߙ௜ሻ, and vice versa. This creates difficulties for the interpretation of panel quantile regressions 
with additive fixed effects, since the results cannot be understood in the same manner as cross-
sectional regressions. 
 
The estimator developed by Powell (2014) is able to address this concern, and to yield 
estimation results which can be interpreted in the same manner as cross-sectional regressions. The 
regression outcomes are modeled as: 
 
 ௜ܻ௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚሺ ௜ܷ௧∗ ሻ (1) 
 
where ௜ܷ௧∗ ~ܷሺͨ,ͩሻ and where ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚሺ߬ሻ is strictly increasing in ߬ ∈ ሺͨ,ͩሻ The outcomes in (1) can be 
compared with other quantile estimators by setting ௜ܷ௧∗ ൌ ݂ሺߙ௜, ௜ܷ௧ሻ. The causal effect of a change in 
the conditioning variable from ݔͩ to ݔͪ for a given  is: 
 
 ݔᇱͪߚሺ߬ሻ െ ݔᇱͩߚሺ߬ሻ (2) 
 
where  denotes the quantile of the distribution. Using (2), we can define the structural quantile 
function (SQF) for equation (1) as: 
 
 ܵ௒ሺ߬|ݔሻ ൌ ݔ′ߚሺ߬ሻ (3) 
 
The identifying assumption for additive fixed effects models is the following: 
 
 ௜ܷ௧|ሺ ௜ܺ௧, ߙ௜ሻ~ܷሺͨ,ͩሻ	 (4) 
 
Powell’s (2014) Quantile Regression Panel Data (QRPD) estimator relaxes (4), and only requires the 
weaker identification assumption: 
 
 ௜ܷ௧∗ | ௜ܺ~ ௜ܷ௦∗ | ௜ܺ                  t, s = 1, 2, …, T (5) 
 
The SQF for the additive fixed effect model is ߙ௜ െ ݔ′ߚሺ߬ሻ, whereas the SQF for the QRPD model is 
ݔ′ߚሺ߬ሻ. As a result, the interpretation of the -th quantile for the QRPD is the same as for the cross-
sectional distribution (or equivalently for the pooled quantile regression). 
 
Table 2 reports the results of quantile regression panel data estimation for our sample of 
nonfinancial companies. The findings reveal that the fixed-effects assumption of constant regression 
coefficients across the distribution of firms is not generally confirmed by the data. The estimated 
coefficients often vary across quantiles, although it is difficult to discern a clear pattern in the data 
across all the financial variables. Regarding capital structure, some of the strongest results are obtained 
for long-term leverage. Both size and the share of tangible assets are positive and statistically 
significant over the central quantiles of the distribution, with the first result consistent with the 
signaling theory of capital structure and the second with collateralizable assets ceasing to be relevant 
for firms with a very low or a very high leverage. 
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Table 2: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Firms, Quantile Regression Panel Data 
 
Total Leverage 1/ Interest Coverage Ratio
Variable             5th         25th            50th         75th          95th Variable             5th        25th           50th         75th          95th 
PROF –0.105 –0.241 –0.232 –0.283** –0.335 (lagged) PROF –0.038 –0.179*** –0.641*** –0.904*** –0.043 
SIZE 0.162*** 6.189 0.057 0.023* 0.040 SIZE 0.001 0.024*** 0.021 0.021 0.040 
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TANG 0.100 1.433 0.250 0.186*** 0.091 TANG 0.008 0.016 0.038 0.021 –0.046 
EVOL 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 (lagged) EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 8.185*** 
NDTS 0.496 2.488 0.784 0.526 0.427 NDTS 0.334 0.442* 0.116 –0.096 –0.448 
Number of 
observations 6,881   
Number of 
observations 6,751 
No. of groups 983 No. of groups 983
  
Long-term Leverage Debt/Earnings Ratio
Variable             5th         25th            50th         75th          95th Variable             5th        25th           50th         75th          95th 
PROF 0.000 –0.006 –0.005 –0.009 –0.160 (lagged) PROF –0.332 –6.904* –11.654*** –17.648*** –24.964*** 
SIZE 0.247 0.012* 0.029*** 0.044*** 0.037 SIZE 7.527*** 0.736 1.044*** 1.256 1.061 
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.000*** 0.000 –0.000*** GROWTA –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 0.008 –0.005 
TANG 0.002 0.037** 0.082*** 0.111** 0.177 TANG 1.768 1.955* 2.368*** 2.532** 10.328 
EVOL –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.029 (lagged) EVOL 0.002 0.007 0.016 0.019 0.368 
NDTS 0.066 –0.057 –0.223 –0.251 –0.047 NDTS –1.324 –9.140 –14.305 –24.029 –41.029 
Number of 
observations 6,881   
Number of 
observations 6,751 
No. of groups 983 No. of groups 983
  
Short-term Leverage 1/ Altman Z-score
Variable             5th         25th            50th         75th          95th Variable             5th        25th           50th         75th          95th 
PROF –0.028 –0.140 –0.108 –0.255** –0.343 (lagged) PROF –0.210 –0.622*** –0.780*** –0.864*** –0.810 
SIZE 0.229 5.029 0.035* –0.008 –0.008 (lagged) SIZE 9.591 0.053*** 0.076 0.091*** 0.081 
GROWTA 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 (lagged) GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 0.001 
TANG 0.011 0.025 0.019 0.044 0.042 (lagged) TANG 0.072 0.126*** 0.186*** 0.216** 0.273 
EVOL 0.000 –0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 (lagged) EVOL 0.010 0.000*** 0.000 0.001 0.156 
NDTS 0.111 0.319 0.896 1.987*** 0.789 (lagged) NDTS –0.010 0.222 0.151 0.753 3.379 
Number of 
observations 6,881   
Number of 
observations 6,747 
No. of groups 983 No. of groups 983
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Lagged profits exert a strong and significance influence on financial ratios. The estimated 
coefficients are negative and significant for the inverse of ICR and for DTE, and increase in size for the 
upper quantiles of the distribution: higher profits therefore reduce the financial fragility of firms. They 
however increase the overall risk of bankruptcy as measured by the Z-score, which may also be 
consistent with signaling theory. Size tends to be associated with high debt–earnings ratios for firms in 
the left tail of the distribution and with lower Z-scores for firms in the central quantiles of the 
distribution. A higher share of tangible assets tends to be associated with larger debt–earnings ratios 
but with lower Z-scores. 
 
The QRPD estimations illustrate that the assumption that regression coefficients are constant 
across the distributions of firms may not be valid. The effects of the regressors on the debt–equity 
ratios or on financial ratios can be different in the middle ranges of the distributions of firms and on the 
tails. The findings from QRPD tend to be more supportive of signaling theories of capital structure than 
the fixed-effects estimates would suggest. 
 
C. Simultaneous Panel Quantile Regressions 
 
The Quantile Regression Panel Data approach of section III.B has the advantage of being directly 
comparable to cross-sectional quantile regression estimations in the interpretation of the regression 
coefficients, because of the weaker identifying assumption (5). Estimation by QRPD however still 
requires that the coefficients remain constant over time. DeAngelo and Roll (2015) recently found 
evidence that firm leverage exhibits significant variability over time. It is important therefore to 
investigate whether the responses of the dependent variables to their determinants vary along the 
economic cycle or over time. If this proves to be the case, then the assumption of constant coefficients 
would not be valid. 
 
Table 3 shows the results of simultaneous panel regressions on total leverage for selected years 
from 2009 to 2015. Compared to QRPD, these estimations reveal that the effects of the explanatory 
variables on the response variables tend to vary over time, as well as across quantiles. For each year, 
the null hypothesis that the coefficients are constant across the distribution is often rejected by F tests. 
Profitability attracts a negative and significant coefficient which becomes larger in absolute value over 
time. Size is only significant for the more recent periods, whereas the effects of tangibility tend to be 
positive and significant across all time periods. 
 
Similar results hold for long-term debt (Appendix Table A4.1), where however profitability 
tends to play a less significant role, and for short-term debt (Appendix Table A4.2).Lagged profitability 
also tends to exert an increasingly important role for the inverse of the ICR (Appendix Table A4.3) and 
for the DTE (Appendix Table A4.4). The influence of the share of tangible assets too becomes more 
significant in the more recent period. A strong cyclical effect appears to be present in the coefficients 
on the inverse Z-scores (Appendix Table A4.5), with the coefficients for profitability and tangible 
assets increasing during the middle years of the sample for the central quantiles and then declining 
towards the end of the sample period. 
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Table 3: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations: Simultaneous Panel Quantile 
Regressions 
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th PROF 0.014 –0.178* –0.285 –0.428***
 SIZE 0.002 0.012** 0.013*** 0.014***
 GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 TANG 0.161*** 0.168*** 0.185*** 0.141***
 EVOL 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000
 NDTS 0.088 –0.099 0.481 0.294
 Constant –0.039 –0.082** –0.099*** –0.090**
25th PROF –0.281** –0.461*** –0.620** –0.722***
 SIZE 0.000 0.021** 0.021*** 0.026***
 GROWTA 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000
 TANG 0.329*** 0.282*** 0.269*** 0.282***
 EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001
 NDTS 0.404 0.164 0.100 –0.135
 Constant 0.020 –0.075* –0.060 –0.103*
50th PROF –0.391*** –0.546*** –0.506*** –0.868***
 SIZE 0.002 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.039***
 GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.001* 0.000
 TANG 0.372*** 0.294*** 0.295*** 0.279***
 EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
 NDTS 0.394 0.858 0.229 0.159
 Constant 0.088* –0.094*** –0.093** –0.104*
75th PROF –0.429** –0.578*** –0.829*** –0.781***
 SIZE 0.003 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.050***
 GROWTA 0.000 –0.001 –0.002* 0.000
 TANG 0.339*** 0.272*** 0.244*** 0.260***
 EVOL 0.001 0.000 0.000 –0.001
 NDTS 0.978 1.248** 1.102 0.710
 Constant 0.173*** 0.055 0.033 –0.100*
95th PROF –0.678*** –0.731*** –1.117** –1.051***
 SIZE 0.006 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.041***
 GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
 TANG 0.229* 0.097 0.150*** 0.062
 EVOL 0.001 –0.001 0.000 –0.001
 NDTS 0.447 1.733*** 1.154*** 0.462
 Constant 0.386*** 0.272*** 0.246*** 0.233**
 F-test on equality of coefficients
 PROF 7.119*** 4.598** 2.874* 2.711*
 SIZE 0.247 4.537** 17.779*** 13.064***
 GROWTA 0.628 0.495 1.883 0.331
 TANG 5.971*** 6.174*** 2.546* 4.168
 EVOL 0.850 7.059*** 3.223* 0.104
 NDTS 0.918 3.030* 1.675 0.358
 Number of 
observations 983 983 983 983 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, 
TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the changing values of the regressions coefficients for total leverage across 
quantiles of the distribution in 2015, the last year of the sample. In particular, the influence of 
profitability tends to increase in absolute value for the top quantiles of the distribution and the 
influence of size tends to increase, whereas tangibility displays an inverted U-shaped pattern. 
Leverage and Capital Structure Determinants of Chinese Listed Companies   |   15 
 
Figure 10: Simultaneous Panel Quantile Regressions 
 
Dependent variable: Total leverage in 2015 
 
 
 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size,  
TANG = tangibility. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
 
The combined results from QRPD and simultaneous panel regressions indicate that the 
assumptions of constant coefficients across firms and over time may not be valid for Chinese 
nonfinancial firms. A number of coefficients increase in size over time pointing to increased sensitivity 
of debt ratios to some of their determinants in recent years. This can be a potential cause for concern, 
since a deterioration in the variables which act as a restraining influence on debt ratios could see even 
greater increases in the leverage of Chinese corporations. 
 
In particular, the simultaneous panel quantile regressions show that the role of profitability in 
reducing debt levels has grown in importance in the more recent period. At the same time, 
nonfinancial corporations have experienced a decline in their profitability in the more recent years. A 
reason for this finding can be traced to the aggressive intervention by Chinese policy authorities in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis. The significant decline in the lending rate since 2008 has 
reduced the opportunity cost of external debt relative to retained earnings as sources of funding, 
thereby increasing firms’ incentive to borrow in preference to internal sources of finance. Together 
with the decline in profitability over the same period, the decline in the opportunity cost of debt 
resulted in a heightened sensitivity of the firm capital structure to earnings. 
 
The joint effect of the increased role of profitability for leverage and of the decline in 
profitability itself is thus likely to lead to larger debt ratios in the coming years. This result is of 
relevance for the future financial sustainability of Chinese firms. It is important to note that this 
conclusion could not have been obtained from an aggregate analysis of financial variables nor from a 
conventional fixed effects analysis, since it only emerges from a simultaneous quantile analysis where 
the regression coefficients are allowed to change over time. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Ever since the Government of the PRC chose to implement a large stimulus to support the economy in 
the wake of the financial crisis of 2008/2009, corporate leverage has experienced a steep and 
sustained increase. The ratios of total debt and of credit to GDP have increased at the same time as 
corporate returns and interest coverage ratios have been weakening, raising concerns about growing 
systemic vulnerability within the Chinese financial system.   
 
Based on the analysis of aggregate data, there is no clear evidence yet of weakening corporate 
performance onto the Chinese financial sector. To an extent, this reflects the predominance of SOEs 
in the Chinese corporate landscape, and authorities’ control over the financial system and its major 
players and institutions. Such a controlled environment has the ability to contain or delay the spillover 
of financial distress from the corporate to the financial sector for some period of time, but not 
indefinitely. Ultimately, growing systemic pressure constitutes a contingent liability to the state, and its 
realization would come to bear heavily on the public budget and debt ratios. 
 
This paper assessed corporate sector fragility through panel regressions that relate leverage 
and other financial indicators to the determinants of capital structure, such as companies’ size and 
profitability. The rationale for quantile regression analysis—of which we implement also the panel 
approach developed recently—is that it picks up vulnerabilities not just at the mean or median of the 
distribution, but also for the more marginal firms, which are those most exposed to negative shocks. 
Indeed, our analysis confirms that the sensitivity of leverage to its determinants varies across quantiles, 
with some areas of the distribution being affected much more strongly than others. We also find that 
some of the estimated coefficients have increased substantially in absolute size over time.  
 
In particular, we find that profitability has a restraining effect on corporate leverage, the 
intensity of which has risen sharply over recent years. Possibly, this can be explained by a significant 
decline in lending rates in the wake of the massive stimulus program, which increased Chinese firms’ 
incentive to borrow instead of relying on retained earnings as a source of finance. Against the backdrop 
of deteriorating profitability, this resulted in firms’ heightened sensitivity of the capital structure to 
earnings. Ultimately, this finding raises some concern about the recent downward trend in corporate 
firms’ profitability, because it implies that firms could react by taking on even larger levels of debt in the 
future. An uptick in corporate profitability in 2016—reflected in the latest data release but not in the 
above analysis—provides some relief in this regard. 
 
In sum, the findings in this paper seem to confirm our hypothesis that financial sector based on 
aggregate indicators tend to overlook the increased vulnerability of the marginal nonfinancial firms in 
the Chinese corporate sector. The fragility of the system tends to be underestimated as a result, and 
may provide a sense of complacency about the stability of the Chinese financial system which is 
unwarranted in view of continuing weakness in the corporate system. 
 
 
 APPENDIX  
 
Table A1: The S&P Capital IQ Database and Regression Variables 
 
Variable Description Measurement
LEV Total leverage Ratio of total debt to total assets
LLEV Long-term leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets
SLEV Short-term leverage Ratio of short-term debt to total assets
ICR Interest coverage ratio Ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and 
amortization) to interest expense 
DTE Debt-to-earnings Ratio of total debt to EBITDA
ZALT Altman Z-score The Z-score is a weighted average of five ratios: (i) working capital/total assets, 
(ii) retained earnings/total assets, (iii) earnings before interest and taxes/total 
assets, (iv) the market value of equity/the book value of total liabilities, and 
(v) sales/total assets. 
PROF Profitability Ratio of EBITDA to total assets
SIZE Size Natural logarithm of total assets
GROWTA Growth opportunities Ratio of revenue growth to total asset growth
TANG Tangibility Ratio of net property, plant, equipment, and inventory to total assets
EVOL Earnings volatility Change of operating income (absolute value of first differences) 
NDTS Nondebt tax shields Ratio of depreciation and amortization (EBITDA-EBIT) to total assets
Notes:  
1. As of November 2016, the S&P Capital IQ database covers more than 45,000 active companies—spanning 130 countries and several 
currencies. It also provides financial statement data for more than 800,000 private companies. Data on fundamentals cover equities, 
fixed income, capital structure, credit ratings, transactions, private equity firm profiles, ownership, and business relationships. It is 
accessible with a subscription: https://www.capitaliq.com/ 
2. For this study, we downloaded data for all private and public firms geographically located in the People’s Republic of China that are 
considered operating as of September 2016. This includes 36 financial ratios, 24 standardized balance sheet and income statement items, 
as well as 10 indicators specific to banks. The data run from 1990 to 2015 and are expressed in US dollar millions, based on the platform’s 
historical exchange rates.  
3. For regression analysis, we retained data from 2009 to 2015 only and computed variables as described in the above table. 
Sources: S&P Capital IQ Fundamentals. http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/documents/products/SPCIQ_Fundamentals_v2.pdf and the 
S&P Capital IQ® Platform. http://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/documents/products/SPCIQ_Platform_v2.pdf 
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Table A2.1: Regression Variables—Summary by Years 
 
Variable 
Year = 2009–2015 Year = 2012 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LEV 6,881 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.86 983 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.72
LLEV 6,881 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.62 983 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.60
SLEV 6,881 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.86 983 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.65
ICR-1 6,881 0.26 0.53 0.00 15.38 983 0.31 0.77 0.00 14.08
DTE 6,881 5.81 11.88 0.00 275.80 983 6.33 15.26 0.02 254.80
ZALT-1 6,881 0.49 2.25 –71.43 166.67 983 0.52 0.42 0.06 4.76
PROF 6,881 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.51 983 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.32
SIZE 6,881 6.74 1.37 3.18 12.87 983 6.81 1.32 4.20 12.76
GROWTA 6,881 0.95 32.34 –520.90 1,985.81 983 1.06 26.18 –207.56 751.67
TANG 6,881 0.48 0.18 0.01 0.95 983 0.49 0.18 0.02 0.94
EVOL 6,881 1.97 13.70 0.00 506.66 983 1.94 13.12 0.00 300.20
NDTS 6,881 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.22 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.15
  Year = 2009 Year = 2013 
LEV 983 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.86 983 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.73
LLEV 983 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.62 983 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.55
SLEV 983 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.86 983 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.54
ICR-1 983 0.20 0.40 0.00 8.06 983 0.26 0.29 0.00 3.46
DTE 983 4.86 11.67 0.01 261.20 983 5.67 8.31 0.03 191.50
ZALT-1 983 0.40 2.39 –71.43 13.70 983 0.54 0.50 0.06 10.64
PROF 983 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.39 983 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.33
SIZE 983 6.09 1.38 3.18 12.27 983 6.97 1.31 4.39 12.87
GROWTA 983 0.40 28.05 –520.90 385.43 983 1.08 8.07 –85.55 127.70
TANG 983 0.49 0.18 0.03 0.95 983 0.49 0.17 0.01 0.94
EVOL 983 2.73 20.91 0.00 506.66 983 2.15 15.74 0.00 315.34
NDTS 983 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.22 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13
  Year = 2010 Year = 2014 
LEV 983 0.25 0.15 0.00 0.69 983 0.27 0.15 0.00 0.73
LLEV 983 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.58 983 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.56
SLEV 983 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.69 983 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.63
ICR-1 983 0.16 0.29 0.00 6.17 983 0.30 0.49 0.00 9.52
DTE 983 4.16 8.75 0.00 193.40 983 6.31 9.97 0.02 182.30
ZALT-1 983 0.41 0.62 0.02 17.24 983 0.53 0.46 –5.41 5.10
PROF 983 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.47 983 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.30
SIZE 983 6.41 1.33 3.73 12.43 983 7.08 1.31 4.46 12.87
GROWTA 983 2.02 22.45 –84.49 616.75 983 –0.58 26.98 –513.95 493.65
TANG 983 0.48 0.18 0.03 0.94 983 0.48 0.18 0.02 0.92
EVOL 983 1.60 10.47 0.00 274.23 983 1.78 12.11 0.00 318.52
NDTS 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.16 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.13
  Year = 2011 Year = 2015 
LEV 983 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.74 983 0.26 0.15 0.00 0.70
LLEV 983 0.08 0.10 0.00 0.52 983 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.48
SLEV 983 0.15 0.11 0.00 0.69 983 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.59
ICR-1 983 0.21 0.40 0.00 7.19 983 0.38 0.77 0.00 15.38
DTE 983 4.69 8.04 0.00 166.10 983 8.65 17.24 0.01 275.80
ZALT-1 983 0.41 0.40 0.04 8.13 983 0.64 5.32 –2.17 166.67
PROF 983 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.51 983 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.26
SIZE 983 6.65 1.31 3.98 12.63 983 7.16 1.30 4.40 12.82
GROWTA 983 1.14 7.08 –101.91 75.76 983 1.53 67.10 –428.02 1,985.81
TANG 983 0.49 0.18 0.03 0.94 983 0.46 0.18 0.01 0.90
EVOL 983 1.40 11.12 0.00 272.49 983 2.16 8.80 0.00 143.68
NDTS 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.15 983 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11
DTE = debt-to-earnings, EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, ICR = interest coverage ratio, LEV = total leverage,  
LLEV = long-term leverage, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, SLEV = short-term leverage, TANG = tangibility,  
ZALT = Altman Z-score. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A2.2: Regression Variables—Summary by Leverage Quantiles 
 
Variable 
Quantile interval = 0–5 Quantile interval = 50–75
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
LEV 344 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 1,720 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.36
PROF 344 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.42 1,720 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.47
SIZE 344 6.26 1.23 3.96 11.11 1,720 6.91 1.37 3.27 11.79
GROWTA 344 0.92 15.77 –142.96 197.71 1,720 0.07 19.28 –428.02 262.49
TANG 344 0.35 0.15 0.01 0.94 1,720 0.50 0.17 0.02 0.91
EVOL 344 1.46 6.10 0.00 59.34 1,720 2.46 18.54 0.00 506.66
NDTS 344 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09 1,720 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.22
  Quantile interval = 5–25 Quantile interval = 75–95
LEV 1,377 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.15 1,376 0.43 0.04 0.36 0.52
PROF 1,377 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.39 1,376 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.27
SIZE 1,377 6.32 1.24 3.21 12.43 1,376 7.08 1.24 3.47 10.87
GROWTA 1,377 0.63 21.45 –520.90 385.43 1,376 1.72 60.27 –513.95 1,985.81
TANG 1,377 0.41 0.16 0.03 0.94 1,376 0.56 0.17 0.01 0.94
EVOL 1,377 1.21 5.31 0.00 94.96 1,376 2.00 12.23 0.00 318.52
NDTS 1,377 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.12 1,376 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.15
  Quantile interval = 25–50 Quantile interval = 95–100
LEV 1,720 0.20 0.03 0.15 0.25 344 0.58 0.05 0.52 0.86
PROF 1,720 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.51 344 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20
SIZE 1,720 6.53 1.40 3.18 12.87 344 7.72 1.35 3.87 10.84
GROWTA 1,720 1.44 21.65 –269.20 616.75 344 1.14 9.85 –74.75 86.21
TANG 1,720 0.47 0.16 0.01 0.92 344 0.60 0.20 0.04 0.95
EVOL 1,720 1.75 12.03 0.00 300.20 344 3.94 23.67 0.00 315.34
NDTS 1,720 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.16 344 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, LEV = total leverage, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, 
TANG = tangibility. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table A3: Interest Coverage Ratio and Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Leverage 
 
Year Number of Companies Corporate Debt ($ billion) 
ICR<1 Total Ratio (%) ICR<1 Total Ratio (%)
1998 2 52 3.8 0.4 33 1.2 
1999 5 107 4.7 0.2 53 0.4 
2000 7 144 4.9 0.5 50 0.9 
2001 2 189 1.1 0.2 55 0.4 
2002 8 219 3.7 1.5 80 1.9 
2003 9 295 3.1 2.9 116 2.5 
2004 8 412 1.9 0.5 159 0.3 
2005 23 594 3.9 5.5 234 2.3 
2006 52 1,580 3.3 6.3 417 1.5 
2007 71 1,944 3.7 12.0 676 1.8 
2008 82 2,142 3.8 34.1 963 3.5 
2009 87 2,412 3.6 17.1 1,095 1.6 
2010 61 2,525 2.4 21.6 1,641 1.3 
2011 78 2,750 2.8 51.4 2,233 2.3 
2012 146 2,955 4.9 203.4 2,952 6.9 
2013 206 3,423 6.0 307.4 4,238 7.3 
2014 272 3,565 7.6 533.7 5,234 10.2 
2015 303 3,377 9.0 728.9 5,135 14.2 
ICR = interest coverage ratio. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on S&P Capital IQ. 
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Table A4.1: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations—SQR for Long-term Leverage 
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th PROF 0.000 0.000 –0.002 –0.007
SIZE 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.004
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NDTS 0.000 0.003 0.000 –0.005
Constant 0.000 –0.004 –0.008 –0.011
25th PROF 0.003 –0.040 –0.068 –0.076***
SIZE 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 0.018***
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.083*** 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.107***
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NDTS –0.137* –0.071 –0.121 –0.344*
Constant –0.085*** –0.087*** –0.120*** –0.134***
50th PROF –0.026 –0.064 0.020 –0.073
SIZE 0.020*** 0.026*** 0.032*** 0.031***
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.169*** 0.130*** 0.184*** 0.168***
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NDTS –0.513* –0.303 –0.458 –0.645*
Constant –0.124*** –0.164*** –0.220*** –0.201***
75th PROF –0.039 –0.188* –0.069 –0.271***
SIZE 0.030*** 0.037*** 0.040*** 0.041***
GROWTA 0.000 –0.001 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.247*** 0.207*** 0.215*** 0.196***
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NDTS –0.345 –0.033 –0.492 –0.608
Constant –0.166*** –0.207*** –0.223*** –0.209***
95th PROF –0.250 –0.275 0.051 0.075
SIZE 0.031** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.044***
GROWTA 0.001 –0.001 –0.002*** 0.000
TANG 0.209** 0.198* 0.130 0.143*
EVOL 0.000 0.000 –0.000** 0.000
NDTS 0.313 0.043 –0.731 –1.038
Constant –0.009 –0.061 0.029 –0.094
  F-test on equality of coefficients   
  PROF 1.048 2.411* 1.758 3.614**
  SIZE 100.924*** 24.201*** 33.270*** 33.056***
  GROWTA 0.408 0.418 2.157 2.358
  TANG 42.578*** 11.711*** 24.552*** 20.804***
  EVOL 0.333 1.453 0.813 1.094
  NDTS 1.707 0.770 0.979 2.348
  
Number of 
observations 983 983 983 983 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size,  
SQR = simultaneous quantile regression, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A4.2: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations—SQR for Short-term Leverage  
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th PROF –0.085** –0.068*** –0.072 –0.146**
SIZE –0.004* –0.002* –0.001 0.001
GROWTA 0.000 –0.000* 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.018 0.015* 0.008 0.003
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
NDTS 0.341** 0.241*** 0.370*** 0.206
Constant 0.030** 0.019* 0.013 0.005
25th PROF –0.106* –0.254*** –0.321*** –0.377***
SIZE –0.015*** –0.010*** –0.009*** –0.005**
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.001* 0.000
TANG 0.059* 0.045 0.053*** 0.012
EVOL 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001
NDTS 0.869** 0.874** 0.453 0.651*
Constant 0.119*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.095***
50th PROF –0.317** –0.404** –0.536*** –0.599***
SIZE –0.023*** –0.012** –0.016*** –0.007*
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000
TANG 0.093** 0.064 0.086** 0.034
EVOL 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
NDTS 1.055** 0.842 1.144** 1.005*
Constant 0.235*** 0.195*** 0.205*** 0.166***
75th PROF –0.240* –0.503*** –0.679*** –0.782***
SIZE –0.029*** –0.013*** –0.008 –0.010*
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.000
TANG 0.107* 0.050 0.031 0.080*
EVOL 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
NDTS 0.731 0.858** 1.108*** 0.729
Constant 0.346*** 0.300*** 0.279*** 0.264***
95th PROF –0.707*** –0.473*** –0.836*** –1.041**
SIZE –0.043*** –0.023* –0.016 0.003
GROWTA 0.000 0.002* –0.002 0.000
TANG 0.093 0.060 0.062 0.099
EVOL 0.002 –0.001 –0.001 0.000
NDTS 0.674 0.423 0.769 0.926
Constant 0.616*** 0.500*** 0.490*** 0.304***
  F-test on equality of coefficients   
  PROF 5.805*** 6.648*** 10.091*** 6.215***
  SIZE 22.949*** 5.530*** 8.819*** 2.912*
  GROWTA 0.564 1.270 1.127 0.230
  TANG 2.759* 0.507 1.387 2.919*
  EVOL 0.714 0.492 0.836 0.071
  NDTS 1.729 3.679 1.377 2.311
  
Number of 
observations 983 983 983 983 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size,  
SQR = simultaneous quantile regression, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A4.3: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations—SQR for the Inverse of ICR  
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th (lagged) PROF –0.113** –0.152*** –0.229*** –0.428***
SIZE –0.001 –0.001 0.000 0.004*
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
TANG 0.030* 0.023** 0.014 0.041*
(lagged) EVOL 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.000
ndts 0.218 0.255** 0.273 0.037
Constant 0.015 0.027** 0.038* 0.022
25th (lagged) PROF –0.462*** –0.545*** –1.068*** –1.444***
SIZE –0.005** –0.003 –0.002 0.005
GROWTA 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.001
TANG 0.050 0.044 0.087 0.081
(lagged) EVOL 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002*
NDTS 0.430* 0.661*** 0.416 0.572
Constant 0.117*** 0.111*** 0.156*** 0.147***
50th (lagged) PROF –0.826*** –1.034*** –1.692*** –2.411***
SIZE –0.009*** –0.002 0.003 0.015*
GROWTA 0.000 –0.001 –0.001 0.001
TANG 0.069*** 0.078** 0.084* 0.083*
(lagged) EVOL 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
NDTS 0.126 0.603* 0.357 0.807
Constant 0.238*** 0.209*** 0.262*** 0.247***
75th (lagged) PROF –1.241*** –1.487*** –2.376*** –3.310***
SIZE –0.007 0.004 0.011 0.012
GROWTA 0.000 –0.002 –0.002*** 0.001
TANG 0.054 0.080* 0.022 –0.010
(lagged) EVOL 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.009
NDTS –0.258 0.010 0.161 0.269
Constant 0.380*** 0.333*** 0.419*** 0.526***
95th (lagged) PROF –1.815*** –2.125*** –3.813*** –7.916***
SIZE –0.022 –0.014 –0.015 –0.032
GROWTA 0.001 –0.005** –0.005 0.002
TANG 0.001 –0.076 0.171 –1.044*
(lagged) EVOL 0.009*** 0.000 0.000 0.028*
NDTS 0.211 –1.768** 1.082 15.614
Constant 0.826*** 0.872*** 0.959*** 1.996**
  F-test on equality of coefficients   
  (lagged) PROF 82.137*** 60.277*** 32.786*** 93.567***
  SIZE 2.217 1.468 0.796 1.498
  GROWTA 1.184 2.994* 1.049 1.318
  TANG 1.982 2.032 1.545 2.590*
  (lagged) EVOL 3.647** 0.054 0.137 3.090*
  NDTS 1.275 4.530** 0.089 0.885
  
Number of 
observations 853 983 983 983 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, ICR = interest coverage ratio, NDTS = nondebt tax shields,  
PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, SQR = simultaneous quantile regression, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A4.4: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations—SQR for Debt-earnings Ratio 
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th (lagged) PROF –2.214 –4.303*** –9.662*** –9.442***
SIZE 0.058 0.059 0.158** 0.228***
GROWTA 0.000 –0.006 –0.011 0.000
TANG 1.695*** 1.473*** 3.362*** 2.269***
(lagged) EVOL 0.006 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.026
NDTS –5.392 –1.601 –16.048** –6.723
Constant –0.301 –0.008 –0.583 –0.956**
25th (lagged) PROF –9.283*** –15.608*** –22.160*** –34.735***
SIZE 0.084 0.260*** 0.250** 0.516***
GROWTA –0.001 –0.015 –0.014*** 0.009
TANG 3.092*** 3.236*** 4.073*** 5.030***
(lagged) EVOL 0.003 0.027* 0.014 0.014
NDTS –14.115** –2.192 –22.746*** –23.437***
Constant 1.031* 0.364 1.246* 0.139
50th (lagged) PROF –16.996*** –21.270*** –34.544*** –49.510***
SIZE 0.275*** 0.370*** 0.514*** 0.790***
GROWTA 0.001 –0.028 –0.028*** 0.011
TANG 4.316*** 3.506*** 4.437*** 5.557***
(lagged) EVOL 0.022 0.038* 0.031 0.021
NDTS –27.796*** –14.349* –28.794*** –35.772***
Constant 1.842* 1.606** 2.013*** 1.414
75th (lagged) PROF –23.817*** –30.528*** –48.645*** –67.840***
SIZE 0.575** 0.565*** 0.798*** 1.218***
GROWTA 0.006 –0.057 –0.039* 0.009
TANG 3.329*** 3.600*** 5.216*** 6.780***
(lagged) EVOL 0.109 0.028 0.042* 0.186
NDTS –40.231** –23.806** –46.853*** –55.336**
Constant 3.552** 3.322*** 3.636* 2.555
95th (lagged) PROF –33.863*** –50.388*** –68.702*** –130.159***
SIZE 1.310 0.709* 1.126 1.069
GROWTA –0.025 –0.131 –0.094* 0.033
TANG 6.713 4.456 12.822* 12.229
(lagged) EVOL 0.545* 0.071 0.003 0.415
NDTS –86.400* –75.970*** –57.822 –109.338
Constant 5.582 10.621*** 6.346 23.464
  F-test on equality of coefficients   
  (lagged) PROF 9.991*** 29.828*** 25.762*** 33.299***
  SIZE 5.295*** 4.928*** 4.355** 12.914***
  GROWTA 2.349 1.577 2.205 0.700
  TANG 3.090* 5.063*** 1.636 5.286***
  (lagged) EVOL 2.192 0.938 0.518 0.577
  NDTS 4.057** 5.082*** 3.354** 2.363
  
Number of 
observations 853 983 983 983 
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size,  
SQR = simultaneous quantile regression, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Table A4.5: Capital Structure of Nonfinancial Corporations—SQR for the Inverse  
of Altman Z-score  
 
Quantile Variable 2009 2011 2013 2015
5th (lagged) PROF –0.243 –0.639*** –1.307*** –0.705***
(lagged) SIZE 0.029** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.056***
(lagged) GROWTA –0.001 0.000 0.000 –0.001
(lagged) TANG 0.224*** 0.118* 0.171** 0.123*
(lagged) EVOL 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(lagged) NDTS –2.729 –0.095 –0.067 –0.873
Constant –0.049 –0.107*** –0.099* –0.225***
25th (lagged) PROF –0.842*** –1.241*** –1.851*** –1.437***
(lagged) SIZE 0.050*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.097***
(lagged) GROWTA 0.001 0.000 0.000 –0.000*
(lagged) TANG 0.189*** 0.231*** 0.303*** 0.220***
(lagged) EVOL 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
(lagged) NDTS –0.206 0.251 0.721 0.394
Constant –0.047 –0.143*** –0.201*** –0.421***
50th (lagged) PROF –1.118*** –1.462*** –2.402*** –1.847***
(lagged) SIZE 0.058*** 0.081*** 0.099*** 0.130***
(lagged) GROWTA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(lagged) TANG 0.236*** 0.376*** 0.402*** 0.331***
(lagged) EVOL 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.003*
(lagged) NDTS 0.283 –0.055 2.032*** 1.179*
Constant –0.012 –0.199*** –0.268*** –0.588***
75th (lagged) PROF –1.088*** –1.509*** –2.741*** –2.176***
(lagged) SIZE 0.043** 0.107*** 0.136*** 0.173***
(lagged) GROWTA 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
(lagged) TANG 0.340*** 0.432*** 0.423*** 0.298***
(lagged) EVOL 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003*
(lagged) NDTS 1.629 –0.161 2.427*** 2.355
Constant 0.175 –0.256*** –0.353** –0.732***
95th (lagged) PROF –1.675** –1.783*** –2.784*** –1.967**
(lagged) SIZE 0.082 0.135*** 0.265*** 0.303***
(lagged) GROWTA 0.010 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(lagged) TANG 0.697*** 0.190 0.501** 0.410
(lagged) EVOL 0.001 –0.001 –0.001 0.001
(lagged) NDTS 1.091 4.524 7.272*** 8.242*
Constant 0.264 –0.028 –0.978*** –1.442***
  F-test on equality of coefficients   
  (lagged) PROF 1.802 9.793*** 7.457*** 7.829***
  (lagged) SIZE 2.805* 13.657*** 14.727*** 11.046***
  (lagged) GROWTA 0.794 0.121 0.180 0.569
  (lagged) TANG 2.664* 5.766*** 4.453** 1.724
  (lagged) EVOL 0.511 0.728 1.495 0.437
  (lagged) NDTS 1.256 2.108 7.504*** 1.782
  Number of observations 849 983 983 983
EVOL = earnings volatility, GROWTA = growth opportunities, NDTS = nondebt tax shields, PROF = profitability, SIZE = size, 
SQR = simultaneous quantile regression, TANG = tangibility. 
Note: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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